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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton engaged in a war of 
words over a potential compromise of classified information 
via email servers during the 2016 presidential election. Hillary 
Clinton told CNN, “[i]t was a mistake for me to use personal 
                                                           
a1 This note was prepared by Dr. Larry W. Perkins in his personal capacity. 
The opinions expressed are the author’s own and do not reflect the view of 
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email. And I regret that.”1 Ms. Clinton then commented during 
the October 9, 2016, presidential debate that “it’s just awfully 
good that someone with the temperament of Donald Trump is 
not in charge of the law of our country.”2 Donald Trump 
responded, “[b]ecause you’d be in jail.”3 
The 2016 presidential election in the United States 
brought the public release of classified information to the 
forefront of discussion worldwide. However, this is not the first 
time discussion as to the consequences for releasing classified 
information into the public realm has occurred. From members 
of Congress to journalists to military generals, there has been an 
ongoing discussion in the United States about how to ensure 
                                                           
1 Elise Labott & M.J. Lee, Clinton reiterates email use was a 'mistake' as 
State Dept. reopens probe, CNN Politics, July 8, 2016, 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/07/politics/state-department-
reopens-probe-into-clinton-emails/, (last visited March 25, 2017); 
Richard Pollock, State Dept Can’t Find Evidence Hillary Was Trained To 
Handle Classified Documents, The Daily Caller, July 10, 2016, 
http://dailycaller.com/2016/07/10/exclusive-state-dept-cant-find-
evidence-hillary-was-trained-to-handle-classified-documents/, (last 
visited March 25, 2017). (Secretary Clinton did not know ‘(C)’ meant 
the information was classified) 
2 Aaron Blake, Everything that was said at the second Donald Trump vs. 
Hillary Clinton debate, highlighted, Wash. Post., October 9, 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2016/10/09/everything-that-was-said-at-the-second-
donald-trump-vs-hillary-clinton-debate-
highlighted/?utm_term=.76c72fa0af9f, (last visited March 25, 2017). 
3 Id. 
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the protection of classified information and deter those with 
access from releasing that information intentionally or 
unintentionally. The distinction is frequently drawn between 
the intentional release and negligent release, but that distinction 
is not always sufficient to determine whether there should be 
consequences for the individual releasing the information. The 
following sections will discuss the numerous examples of how 
the law on the release of classified information has been applied 
previously and how that implementation was not always 
consistent. Ultimately, the United States needs a single clear law 
on classified information that is implemented consistently 
across the board. The level of punishment should be 
determined by the intent of the crime. However, those who 
negligently disclose classified information should also receive 
punishment; the fact that the classified information took a non-
physical form should not equate to a get out of jail free card. 
This paper will investigate the current law as it relates 
to the unlawful public release of classified information. Noting 
that the federal government has used multiple statutes to 
prosecute individuals that release classified information 
inappropriately, the vast majority of the prosecutions utilize the 
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Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. Chapter 37 Sections 791-7994. The 
primary sections of this act that have been utilized are 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 793 and 794.5 As such, Part II of this paper will focus on the 
required paperwork and training necessary to obtain a 
government security clearance, as well as the use of the 
Espionage Act, specifically 18 U.S.C. §§ 793 and 794,6 and the 
common challenges to those provisions. This information will 
provide an understanding of the current law, what federal 
employees and contractors are told with respect to the access 
and release of classified information, and how that law is 
applied. This section includes a sampling of recent cases and 
instances where the current law has been applied to individuals 
and demonstrates the confusion and lack of consistency in the 
application and prosecution of disclosure violations. In Part III 
of this paper, the public’s perception of classified information 
and what protection is given such information will be explored. 
Finally, in Part IV, I argue that the laws pertaining to the 
                                                           
4 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 791-799 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114-
248). 
5 18 U.S.C.A. § 793 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114-248); 18 
U.S.C.A. § 794 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114-248). 
6 Id. 
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disclosure of classified information must be clarified and 
consistently implemented to effectively protect classified 
information. Specifically, (1) §§ 793 and 7947 should be 
modified and simplified; (2) prosecutions should be 
emphasized for both high profile government officials and low-
level staff; (3) training of employees and contractors with 
security clearances should be improved; and (4) the public 
should be better informed as to the reasons information is made 
classified and as to why government officials and contractors  
cannot comment on the information. 
 
II. CURRENT LAW AND TRAINING   
 
There are three types of classified information when it 
comes to national security interests: (1) Confidential, (2) Secret, 
and (3) Top Secret.8 Confidential information is the lowest level 
of classified information and is defined as information that 
                                                           
7 Id. 
8  Northrop Grumman, Annual DoD Security Refresher Training, 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&
cd=1&ved=0ahUKEwiWuKLWzovSAhUDQiYKHbxbB6IQFggaMA
A&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.northropgrumman.com%2FAboutUs
%2FDocuments%2FClearance%2Fannual_dod_refresher_ext.pdf&us
g=AFQjCNEBGi0CXrycDXt5EQ8dpcsUZB1hlA&bvm=bv.146786187,
d.eWE, (last visited March 25, 2017). 
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could cause damage to national security if released.9 The next 
level of classified information, Secret, is defined as information 
that could cause grave damage to national security if released.10 
Finally, the highest level of classification, Top Secret, is defined 
as information that could cause exceptionally grave damage to 
national security if released.11 A security clearance is required 
to access any of these three types of classified information.12 An 
individual will know if a particular document is classified for a 
number of reasons including that the document must be 
labeled, the document must contain a specific coversheet, 
electronic transmittal of the document requires an approved 
secure communication system, and the document may only be 
viewed in approved areas (e.g., may not be taken home) unless 
approved by senior management.13 There is other information 
that may not be released to the public but is not classified and 
does not require a security clearance to access (e.g., Official Use 
                                                           
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 DoD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information, 
DOD Manual Department of Defense Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, 
Change 2, March 19, 2013. 
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Only Information, Law Enforcement Sensitive Information).14 
This paper is focused on the classified information that requires  
a security clearance for access. 
A. TRAINING  
 
Training individuals with access to classified 
information is required but may be slightly different among 
federal agencies (e.g., the Department of Defense has specific 
security manuals and annual training documents15). Generally, 
an individual that is applying for a security clearance must 
complete a 127-page form that addresses past personal and 
professional life and experiences.16 These individuals are also 
required to sign a nondisclosure agreement which states: 
I have been advised that the unauthorized 
disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent 
handling of classified information by me could 
cause damage or irreparable injury to the United 
States or could be used to advantage by a foreign 
nation. I hereby agree that I will never divulge 
classified information to anyone unless: (a) I 
have officially verified that the recipient has 
been properly authorized by the United States 
Government to receive it; or (b) I have been 
given prior written notice of authorization from 
the United States Government Department or 
Agency (hereinafter Department or Agency) 
                                                           
14 DOD, supra note 8; Dept. of Homeland Security, Safeguarding 
Sensitive But Unclassified (For Official use Only) Information, MD 
Number 11042.1, Jan. 6, 2005. 
15 DOD, supra note 8; DOD, supra note 13. 
16 SF86-10, Questionnaire For National Security Positions. 
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responsible for the classification of information 
or last granting me a security clearance that such 
disclosure is permitted. I understand that if I am 
uncertain about the classification status of 
information, I am required to confirm from an 
authorized official that the information is 
unclassified before I may disclose it, except to a 
person as provided in (a) or (b), above. I further 
understand that I am obligated to comply with 
laws and regulations that prohibit the 
unauthorized disclosure of classified 
information.17 
In addition to the nondisclosure agreement, additional 
training regarding the handling of classified information is also 
required annually. The training reminds security clearance 
holders of their responsibilities and requirements for protecting 
classified information.18 Unfortunately, the required annual 
training is frequently not completed.19 For example, in 2009 
only 20% of the cleared individuals at the State Department had 
completed the required training.20 It was also reported that only 
                                                           
17 SF312-13, Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement. 
18 DOD, supra note 8. 
19 Catherine Herridge, Fewer than one in five State Dept employees with 
security clearance completed classified info training, FoxNews, Sept. 27, 
2016, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/09/27/fewer-than-
one-in-five-state-dept-employees-with-security-clearance-
completed-classified-info-training.html; Compliance Follow-up Review 
of the Department of State’s Implementation of Executive Order 13526, 
Classified National Security Information, AUD-SI-16-43, September 
2016, (last visited March 25, 2017). 
20 Id. 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 117  
 
twenty-percent of the cleared State Department employees had 
completed the training at least once since obtaining a 
clearance.21 The Office of Inspector General was unable to 
identify the number of State Department contractors that had 
completed the training because the Bureau of Diplomatic 
Security could not provide a complete list of all current 
Department security-cleared contractors.22 
B. CURRENT STATUTORY VIOLATIONS  
 
The current statutes used to prosecute those who 
unlawfully disclose classified information include everything 
from theft of government information to espionage. However, 
the vast majority of the prosecutions fall under the Espionage 
Act as codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 791-99.23 The key sections of this 
law that address the release of classified information are 
18 U.S.C. §§ 793 and 794, which restrict the gathering, 
transmitting or losing defense information.24 The remaining 
sections of the Espionage Act are more focused and less useful 
                                                           
21 Id. 
22 Compliance Follow-up Review of the Department of State’s 
Implementation of Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security 
Information, AUD-SI-16-43, September 2016. 
23 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 791-799.  
24 18 U.S.C.A. § 793; 18 U.S.C.A. § 794.  
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for prosecutors. Specifically, § 791 has been repealed;25 § 792 
involves harboring persons;26 § 795 involves photographing or 
sketching defense facilities;27 § 796 involves using aircraft to 
photograph defense facilities;28 § 797 involves publication and 
sale of photographs of defense facilities;29 and § 798 involves 
communication and cyphers.30 While each of these sections 
could be used in specific situations, the more widely used 
sections of §§ 793 and 794 focus on gathering and transmitting 
information that could harm the defense of the United States.31 
As such, the remainder of this paper will focus on challenges 
that have been made to §§ 793 and 794.32 The following 
discussion provides a summary of the elements in each 
subsection of §§ 793 and 794.33 
Section 793(a) applies to those individuals who obtain 
information with respect to the “national defense” with an 
                                                           
25 18 U.S.C.A. § 791 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114-327). 
26 18 U.S.C.A. § 792 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114-327). 
27 18 U.S.C.A. § 795 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114-248). 
28 18 U.S.C.A. § 796 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114-248). 
29 18 U.S.C.A. § 797 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114-248). 
30 18 U.S.C.A. § 798 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114-248). 
31 18 U.S.C.A. § 793; 18 U.S.C.A. § 794.  
32 Id. 
33 Id. (The full text of the §§ 793 and 794 are provided in Attachment 
1 for reference.) 
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intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to 
the injury of the U.S. or to the advantage of a foreign nation.34 
These individuals might not have a security clearance but 
trespass on a military base and take pictures of classified 
military weapons projects or steal classified military plans.35 
Section 793(b) contains the same requirements and 
reason as § 793(a), but the individual might not have been 
successful in obtaining the classified material but merely 
attempts to copy it.36 
Section 793(c) contains the same requirements as § 
793(a) but applies to those individuals who are interested in 
receiving such classified information.37 In addition, this 
subsection specifically requires that the defendant know or 
have reason to believe that the information was or will be 
obtained in violation of this statute.38 
Section 793(d) applies to individuals with security 
clearance who are legally in possession or have access to the 
                                                           
34 18 U.S.C.A. § 793.  
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
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information and willfully provide such information to 
individuals who do not have the requisite security clearance to 
view the material.39 The classified information must be 
“relating to the national defense” and can include writings and 
code books.40 The defendant must also have reason to believe 
that the information could be used to injure the United States or 
aid a foreign nation.41 It is also a violation when a defendant has 
possession of the information and refuses to produce it when 
asked by U.S. officials.42 This section was used for one of the 
charges against Edward Snowden. 
Section 793(e) contains the same requirements as § 
793(d); however, this subsection applies to those who find 
themselves unlawfully coming into contact with such material 
and then distributing it to other such individuals not authorized 
to receive the information.43 For example, the media outlet with 
unlawful access passing the information on to the public. 
                                                           
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
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Section 793(f) also requires that the defendant have 
lawful possession of the information (e.g., document, code 
book, etc.) and that the information is “relating to the national 
defense.”44 However, this section applies to those individuals 
with a security clearance who are grossly negligent and allow 
such material to fall into the hands of those not cleared.45 The 
gross negligent mens rea requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 793(f) 
includes the loss of classified information due to negligence 
(e.g., forgetting it).46 Examples of a negligent disclosure are 
Secretary Clinton’s email server or a secret service agent leaving 
a laptop with classified information in a car which is stolen. In 
addition, the defendant is also in violation of this subsection if 
he or she has knowledge of the event and fails to report it to his 
superior officer.47  
Section 793 prescribes a punishment of a fine and 
imprisonment not more than ten years.48 Under the U.S. federal 
sentencing guidelines, with no prior criminal history, the 
                                                           
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 United States v. Gonzalez, 16 M.J. 428, 429-430 (1983). 
47 Id. (Section 793 (g) is the conspiracy provision while § 793 (h) 
addresses forfeiture of property under this statute). 
48 18 U.S.C.A. § 793.  
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imprisonment for violation of this section varies depending on 
the details and the subsection violated as shown in the 
following table.49 
Section 
Top Secret 
Information 
Other Classified 
Information 
793 (a) 168-210 months 97-121 months 
793 (b) 168-210 months 97-121 months 
793 (c) 168-210 months 97-121 months 
793 (d) 
168-210 months or 
87-108 months 
Depending on the 
details of the 
violation 
97-121 months or 
51-63 months 
Depending on the 
details of the violation 
793 (e) 
168-210 months or 
87-108 months 
Depending on the 
details of the 
violation 
97-121 months or 
51-63 months 
Depending on the 
details of the violation 
793 (f) 27-33 months 12-18 months 
793 (g) 
168-210 months or 
87-108 months 
Depending on the 
details of the 
violation 
97-121 months or 
51-63 months 
Depending on the 
details of the violation 
794 360 months – life 210-262 months 
                                                           
49 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, §§2M3.2-
2M3.4 (Nov. 2016). 
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Similar to § 793(a), § 794(a) applies to any individual 
(with or without a security clearance) that obtains material with 
respect to the “national defense” and passes on such material 
with the intent or a reason to believe that it is to be used to the 
injury of the U.S. or advantage of a foreign nation.50 In addition 
to § 793(a) requirements, this subsection requires that that 
information be provided to, or an attempt was made to provide 
the information to a foreign country.51 For example, it would be 
difficult to prosecute Secretary Clinton or General Petraeus 
under this section unless there was some proof that they 
intended or had reason to know the actions would result in 
delivery of classified information to a foreign nation and it 
would injure the U.S. or be an advantage to the foreign nation. 
The section sets out the penalties and when they may be 
applied.52 Specifically, § 794 prescribes a punishment of death 
or imprisonment for any term of years up to life.53 Under the 
                                                           
50 18 U.S.C.A. § 794.  
51 Id. 
52 Id. (§ 794 (b) addresses the release of information during a time of 
war.  In addition, § 794 (c) addresses a conspiracy with respect to this 
statute while § 794 (d) addresses forfeiture of property under this 
statute). 
53 Id. 
 
124                     5 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2017) 
 
U.S. federal sentencing guidelines, with no prior criminal 
history, the imprisonment for violation of this section is 360 
months to life for Top Secret classified information and between 
210-262 months for other classified information.54 
The Espionage Act has many nuances and specifics that 
are required to obtain a conviction under the statute. The result 
is a confusing set of laws that require significant interpretation 
by the courts. This confusion is what defendants have 
frequently challenged to avoid conviction under the Espionage 
Act. Some of the primary examples of these challenges are the  
focus of the following section. 
 
C. CHALLENGE TO THE ESPIONAGE ACT 
 
There is a fair amount of case history associated with 18 
U.S.C. §§ 793-94 challenging various sections and arguing that 
phrases are void for vagueness, that various mens rea 
requirements are not clear or met, that the statute violates the 
free speech and self-incrimination rights of the U.S. 
Constitution and that the statute violates the Congressional 
                                                           
54 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, §2M3.1 
(Nov. 2016). 
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requirements associated with treason. 55 We address each of 
these challenges in the following discussion. 
One of the primary challenges that has been made to §§ 
793 and 794 has been with respect to the phrase “national 
defense.” 56 Each subsection of § 793 and subsection (a) of § 794 
use the phrase “national defense” when addressing the type of 
information that is covered by that specific subsection.57 
The Supreme Court has defined the phrase “national 
defense.”58 Specifically, the Court held in United States v. Abu-
Jihaad that “national defense” is not defined in the code but has 
been consistently interpreted by the courts to be a “generic 
concept of broad connotations, referring to the military and 
naval establishments and the related activities of national 
preparedness.”59 The Court then discussed limitations on the 
use of this phrase in a prosecution.60 The Court indicated that 
the information must be “closely held.”61 This limitation was 
                                                           
55 18 U.S.C.A. § 793; 18 U.S.C.A. § 794. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 600 F.Supp.2d 362, 385-88 (D. Conn. 
2009). 
59 Id. at 385. 
60 Id. at 386-88. 
61 Id. at 386. 
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explained by the Court by noting that a conviction could not be 
maintained if the defendant collected the information from 
publicly available sources and pieced it together on his own.62 
The Court explained that if the Government did not keep the 
information secret, then use of the information was not a 
violation of the espionage laws.63 This is distinguishable from 
the issues surrounding Edward Snowden because the 
government did protect that information but it was stolen by 
someone with a security clearance. Further, individuals with a 
security clearance are trained that they must have a need-to-
know to view classified information; therefore, they are not 
allowed to view WikiLeaks information that may be classified 
and must not confirm or deny any information associated with 
those leaks.64 The Court went further to explain that the statute 
does not strictly require the information be classified for a 
prosecution, but classification of the information is an 
important consideration in determining if the information falls 
under the statute.65 The Court has also clarified that “national 
                                                           
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 DOD, supra note 8. 
65 Abu-Jihaad, 600 F.Supp.2d at 387. 
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defense” is not restricted to military activities and facilities (e.g., 
a study of a worldwide communication satellite system by the 
Central Intelligence Agency).66 In 2011, the Supreme Court 
rejected claims that “national defense” was too vague to allow 
implementation via the statute.67 
Some defendants have also attempted to use the 
doctrine of noscitur a sociis (“words are generally known by the 
company they keep”) to argue that “information relating to the 
national defense” is not clear as to whether it applies to tangible 
information, intangible information, or both. 68 However, the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Kim concluded that the statute 
provides an appropriate standard of conduct and is not vague.69 
In United States v. Kiriakou, the Court clarified that “information 
regarding the national defense” consists of tangible and 
intangible information in § 793(d).70 Tangible information 
would include things such as books and documents while 
intangible information would be knowledge.71 The difference 
                                                           
66 United States v. Boyce, 594 F.2d 1246, 1251 (9th Cir. 1979). 
67 United States v. Drake, 818 F.Supp.2d 909, 916-19 (D. Md.2011). 
68 United States v. Kim, 808 F.Supp.2d 44 (D.D.C.2011). 
69 Id. at 51-53. 
70 United States v. Kiriakou, 898 F.Supp.2d 921, 923 (E.D. Va. 2012). 
71 Id. 
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between the two in the statute depends on the mens rea in the 
subsection with intangible property requiring a “reason to 
believe could cause injury” or a bad faith requirement.72 
Still, other phrases in the various statutes have also been 
challenged for vagueness. The military courts addressed the 
“unauthorized possession” language in § 793(e) and concluded 
that authorized possession turns into unauthorized possession 
when the individual exceeds the scope of the authorization that 
was provided to him.73 The defense argued in United States v. 
McGuinness that because the defendant was authorized to 
access the information, he did not have “unauthorized 
possession.”74 18 U.S.C § 793(f) has been challenged by 
indicating that the phrase in the statute that says the violator 
“permits” the information to be removed prohibits its 
application if the defendant removed the classified materials 
himself.75 Thus, the defendant did not “permit” someone to 
access the information because he took it himself.76 The military 
                                                           
72 Id. at 923-24. 
73 United States v. McGuinness, 33 M.J. 781, 786 (1991); United States 
v. McGuinness, 35 M.J. 149, 152-53 (1992). 
74 McGuinness, 33 M.J. at 784; McGuinness, 35 M.J. at 152. 
75 United States v. Roller, 37 M.J. 1093 (1993). 
76 Id. 
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courts rejected this challenge and indicated that the defendant 
removing the information himself was still “permitting” the 
classified information to be removed as defined in the statute.77 
In 2011, the Supreme Court also rejected claims that 
“willfulness” was too vague to allow implementation via § 
793(e).78 
Another frequent challenge to convictions under §§ 793-
794 centers around the mens rea and the mindset of the 
individual that was charged with violation of the statute. 79 This 
challenge has also been addressed by the courts. For example, 
the Supreme Court ruled that a conviction under § 793(d) 
requires proof that the defendant was legally in possession of 
the material, the material must be “associated with the national 
defense”, and the defendant must have tried to provide that 
information to someone that was not authorized to have the 
material.80 In 2009, the Supreme Court clarified that in addition 
to the defendant having lawful possession of the material, the 
material being related to “the national defense”, and the 
                                                           
77 Id. 
78 Drake, 818 F.Supp.2d at 916-19. 
79 18 U.S.C.A. § 793; 18 U.S.C.A. § 794. 
80 Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 721-22 (1989). 
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material being provided to someone not authorized to receive 
it, § 793(d) also requires that the information be communicated 
willfully and the defendant must have a reason to believe the 
information could harm the United States or help a foreign 
government.81 In 1971, the United States Court of Military 
Appeals indicated that § 793(d) required willfulness, but did 
not require bad faith was for a conviction under the statute.82 
The military courts have also provided explanation and 
clarification on the mens rea required for the espionage laws. 
The courts explained the various levels of mens rea by 
explaining that 18 U.S.C. § 793(a) requires bad faith, whereas § 
793(e) requires only willfulness and § 793(f) requires gross 
negligence.83 
The Supreme Court also addressed the distinction 
between § 793(d) and § 794(a).84 The Court held that § 793(d) 
only addresses those individuals who are trusted with the 
classified information and subsequently violated that trust.85 
                                                           
81 United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 600 F.Supp.2d 362, 384, 388 (D. Conn. 
2009). 
82 United States v. Attardi, 20 USCMA 548, 554 (1971). 
83 United States v. Diaz, 69 M.J. 127, 132-33 (2010). 
84 Hoffman, 995 F.Supp.2d at 565. 
85 Id. 
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The Court held that § 793(d) may be used to prosecute the 
individual for attempting to provide the information to anyone 
not entitled to receive it.86 Conversely, according to § 794(a) it is 
irrelevant how the individual received the classified 
information; the fact that the person has the information and 
attempted to provide it to a foreign government is adequate for 
this element of the crime.87 As such, § 794(a) is broader than § 
793(d) as it relates to the details of the case (e.g., how the 
information was obtained) and therefore easier to prosecute.88 
Prosecutors have also charged individuals when the 
recipient of the information was not a foreign government 
news. In 1985, defense attorneys argued that § 793(e) was not 
applicable when classified information is released to the press.89 
The Court concluded that the United States would be just as 
harmed by a release of information to the press as release to a 
single individual.90 
                                                           
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 United States v. Morison, 604 F.Supp. 655, 657-58 (D. Md.1985). 
90 Id. at 660, 662; United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1063-68 (4th 
Cir.1988). 
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Defense attorneys have also argued that the 
requirement to produce information when requested under § 
793(e) was a violation of a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights 
because such production required the defendant to incriminate 
himself by admitting he had possession of the information.91 
However, the Court concluded that this claim was not material 
as there is no provision in the statute to punish an individual 
that has possession of classified information but returns that 
information when requested by the government (i.e., one 
element of the crime is to willfully retain or fail to return the 
classified information).92 As such, the military courts and the 
Supreme Court both concluded that requiring the return of 
classified information does not violate a defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment rights.93 
Defendants have also challenged the Espionage Act by 
claiming that it violates the Treason Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution because the activities in the Espionage Act are not 
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specifically defined in the Constitution.94 However, the 
Supreme Court concluded that Congress has the authority to 
specify other conduct that is not equivalent to treason but still 
punishable under the espionage laws.95 Similarly, the Court 
rejected a claim that the government was not consistent in what 
they prosecute under the statute and therefore it was 
impossible for the defendant to know what was illegal.96 The 
Court explained that this argument does not hold any water for 
a number of reasons including the government’s difficulty of 
meeting the elements of the conviction and the complications of 
having a trial with classified information.97 In the same case, the 
Court rejected a claim that oral communication of classified 
information was protected as free speech under the First 
Amendment to the Constitution.98 
In United States v. Rosen, one of the most well-known 
cases on espionage, the defendants argued § 793 violated the 
First and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 
                                                           
94 Kim, 808 F.Supp.2d. 44. 
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however, these challenges were rejected by the Court.99 The 
Court noted that this was not a blanket exemption from a First 
Amendment challenge but must be considered on a case by case 
basis.100 Specifically, the Court held that individuals that work 
for or with the government frequently have a contractual 
arrangement of some type and could be prosecuted without 
violating the First Amendment, but individuals not associated 
with the government could only be prosecuted if the release of 
information was directly related to national security.101 The 
Court also clarified that release of classified information implies 
the government has indicated it is accurate and could still result 
in a conviction under § 793, even if the information was already 
available to the public.102 The Court in Rosen rejected a claim 
that the information was received orally and therefore could 
not be confirmed to be classified when released.103 The Court 
also rejected a claim that the defendants did not receive fair 
warning of how the statute would be applied.104 
D. EXAMPLES OF APPLICATION OF CURRENT LAW  
                                                           
99 United States v. Rosen, 445 F.Supp.2d 602, 607 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
100 Id. at 632. 
101 Id. at 635-39. 
102 Id. at 620. 
103 Id. at 623. 
104 Id. at 627-28. 
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As noted by the Supreme Court, prosecutions under § 
793 are not frequent, presumably due to the tight restrictions 
placed on successful prosecution within the language of the 
statute itself.105 However, there have been some recent 
examples of prosecutions using § 793. For example, in United 
States v. Hitselberger, the defendant was charged under § 793(e) 
for removing and retaining documents associated with national 
defense, among other charges beyond the Espionage Act such 
as removing public documents from a secure location.106 The 
defendant made a conscious effort to hide the classified 
material and sneak it out undetected.107 In another case, a 
retired Navy radioman was court-martialed and sentenced to 
eight years in prison for conducting espionage for the 
government of the Philippines when he collected and stole 
classified communication information in violation of § 793(d).108 
Theresa Marie Squillacote was convicted of espionage, 
                                                           
105 Id. at 613. 
106 United States v. Hitselberger, 991 F.Supp.2d 130, 133 (D.D.C. 
2014); United States v. Hitselberger, 991 F.Supp.2d 101, 102 (D.D.C. 
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including § 793(b) and § 794(a), on behalf of Germany and 
sentenced to just under 22 years imprisonment when she copied 
and attempted to transmit classified documents to various 
foreign governments.109 Abu-Jihaad was convicted of espionage 
under statutes including § 793(d) and sentenced to ten years 
imprisonment for transferring classified information to Azzam 
Publications in support of jihad.110 There were also some other 
cases prior to 2000 where defendants were convicted under § 
793 subsections (a)-(g) and § 794 subsections (a)-(b).111 The one 
common theme in these cases is that each defendant was 
making an intentional, conscious effort to collect and steal the 
classified information. 
III. PUBLIC PERCEPTION   
                                                           
109 In re Squillacote, 790 A.2d 514, 514, 516 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
110 Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 362. 
111 McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U.S. 21 (1975); Truong Dinh Hung 
v. United States, 439 U.S. 1326 (1978); Morison v. United States, 486 
U.S. 1306 (1988); United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d 
Cir.1952); United States v. Abel, 258 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.1958); 
Boeckenhaupt v. United States, 392 F.2d 24 (4th Cir.1968); 
Boeckenhaupt v. United States, 537 F.2d 1182 (4th Cir.1976); United 
States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir.1987); United States v. Pollard, 
959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir.1992); United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 
1233 (7th Cir.1979); United States v. Boyce, 594 F.2d 1246 (9th 
Cir.1979); United States v. Lee, 589 F.2d 980 (9th Cir.1979); United 
States v. Miller, 984 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir.1993); United States v. 
Forbrich, 758 F.2d 555 (11th Cir.1985); Coplon v. United States, 191 
F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir.1951); Scarbeck v. United States, 317 F.2d 546 (D.C. 
Cir.1962);United States v. Kostadinov, 572 F.Supp. 1547 ( 
S.D.N.Y.1983); United States v. Lee, 79 F.Supp.2d 1280 (D.N.M.1999).  
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The public is not trained or knowledgeable of the 
requirements associated with classified information and how it 
must be protected. As a result, the public gets most, if not all, of 
their information and knowledge from the media and news 
articles. Unfortunately, the news media is also uninformed and 
lacks the knowledge to inform the public as to the requirements 
associated with classified information. For example, the media 
reported extensively on some high-profile cases such as 
Edward Snowden. A vast majority of the discussion and articles 
that have been published by the media about Snowden have 
focused on whether Snowden is a hero or a villain.112 The same 
type of discussion of Secretary Clinton’s emails has been raging 
in the media as demonstrated during the 2016 Presidential 
election. So, how does the information provided in the media 
                                                           
112 Nate Fick, Was Snowden hero or traitor?  Perhaps a little of both, 
Wash. Post, January 19, 2017, 
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relate to the information available from the actual government 
agencies responsible for protecting classified information? 
The Brennan Center for Justice at New York University 
School of Law published an article about the lack of protection 
for whistleblowers as it relates to national security.113 This 
article stated, “existing legal protections for whistleblowers are 
limited and generally do not extend to leaks of classified 
information.”114 The article also stated that recent orders that 
are intended to address this issue are not adequate and that no 
disclosure is protected from criminal prosecution.115 In reality, 
this article is incredibly misleading. While it is true that simply 
releasing classified information is not allowed, it is not true that 
whistleblowers are unprotected if classified information is 
involved. The Intelligence Community Whistleblower 
Protection Act (ICWPA) of 1998 discussed how to use secure 
methods to report issues associated with classified information 
                                                           
113 National Security Whistleblowing: A Gap in the Law, Brennan Center 
for Justice, Aug. 21, 2013, 
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/national-security-
whistleblowing-gap-law, (last visited March 25, 2017). 
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to Congress.116 When appropriate concerns are reported 
through this manner, the whistleblower is protected.117 This 
was emphasized in a 2007 report for Congress on the 
Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) which stated: 
 The WPA protects ‘any’ disclosure evidencing a 
reasonable belief of specified misconduct, a 
cornerstone to which the MSPB [Merit Systems 
Protection Board] remains blind. The only 
restrictions are for classified information or 
material the release of which is specifically 
prohibited by statute. Employees must disclose 
that type of information through confidential 
channels to maintain protection; otherwise there 
are no exceptions.118 
As noted by reports for Congress and the Inspector 
General, protection is provided for whistleblowers using 
classified information, but they must follow a specified 
procedure to ensure proper protection of that classified 
information.119 The Brennan Center report that is available to 
the public is inaccurate with respect to whistleblowers and 
                                                           
116 Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA), 
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classified information and misleads the public on the topic.120 
This inaccuracy is also proven false by reviewing the federal 
training on whistleblowers.121 The training specifically states 
that classified information may be released in a whistleblower 
action, but it must be in a proper manner and location.122 For 
example, if Edward Snowden had developed concerns with 
how the National Security Agency was using metadata, he 
could have sent the information via specified secure means to 
the Inspector General or called a Defense hotline for further 
instructions on how to communicate the concern. 
The Washington Post also ran an opinion article about 
the myths associated with classified information.123 In this 
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article, the Washington Post claims that even if an official 
decides that disclosure would be harmful if released, he or she 
is not required to make the information classified.124 To the 
contrary, it is impossible for an uncleared news reporter to 
determine what information is improperly classified. Nor does 
the article offer any evidence or reference to support this false 
claim. Rather the Department of Defense manual discusses 
required training for those who make classification decisions.125 
The training emphasizes avoiding over-classification.126 In 
other words, the individuals must classify information based on 
content and not on whether the information would be harmful. 
The Washington Post then states that derivative 
classification can be performed by any individual that can 
access the information.127 This demonstrates a lack of 
understanding of classification. In reality, there are two types of 
classification, original classification and derivative 
classification.128 Original classification is the determination as to 
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whether information should be classified or not.129 The original 
classification authority is only available to persons who have a 
“unique mission with responsibility in one of the subject areas 
prescribed.”130 These individuals are specifically designated 
and do not include all employees.131 Derivative classification 
occurs when information is derived from other classified 
information.132 This results in the new document being 
classified, but that derivative classifier (i.e., the person 
generating the document with the derivative information) is not 
determining whether the original information should or should 
not be classified.133 Similarly, the Department of Defense 
indicates that derivative classifiers must be properly trained 
and an individual not trained may not serve as a derivative 
classifier.134 
The Washington Post article goes on to indicate that 
there is no protection for whistleblowers.135 As discussed 
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previously, there are many ways that whistleblowers are 
protected when it comes to classified information, but there is a 
requirement to follow a specific process.136 
The Washington Post article also indicates that our 
classification system does not protect individuals from harm 
and proposes an easy fix is that declassification should be 
automatic after a set period of time.137 These claims are made 
based on assumptions that are not substantiated in any way. 
President Eisenhower once stated “[I]t is mandatory that the 
United States protect itself against hostile or destructive 
activities by preventing unauthorized disclosures of classified 
information relating to the national defense . . . .”138 Current 
world events more than destroy the claim for automatic 
declassification. The United States built a nuclear weapon 
during World War II. Countries today, such as North Korea or 
Iran, would be happy to get any information used during that 
effort, even if the technology is old and inefficient. Automatic 
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declassification would essentially put military technology and 
nuclear weapons in the hands of every country around the 
globe. These claims by the Washington Post associated with 
classified information serve to further mislead and confuse the 
public at large. 
One cannot describe the public’s understanding of 
classified information without discussing Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton’s emails. Numerous news articles implied that 
these activities were prevalent throughout the government. For 
example, reports indicated that Secretary Clinton was not 
trained on proper handling of classified materials.139 The 
implication, whether intentional or not, is that if the Secretary 
of State does not get training, then it is likely most individuals 
with access to classified information are not trained. While 
reports indicate that a large percentage of employees were not 
trained in the State Department,140 there is no information that 
this is prevalent among other federal agencies that handle 
                                                           
139 Richard Pollock, State Dept Can’t Find Evidence Hillary Was Trained 
To Handle Classified Documents, The Daily Caller, July 10, 2016, 
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classified information. Other high-profile cases in the recent 
past have led the public to believe that classified information is 
not protected adequately and perhaps does not need to be. 
Specifically, General David Petraeus admitted to allowing 
unauthorized individual access to classified information.141 
General Petraeus plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge of 
mishandling classified information resulting in a fine and two 
years of probation but no jail time.142 
What these articles do not report is that great lengths are 
taken to protect our nation’s secrets. For example, the Court has 
protected classified information during hearings and trials 
indicating that the information may be protected from public 
release if it is a matter of national security, but methods should 
be used to ensure the protection does not affect the defendant’s 
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right to a fair trial.143 This disconnect is exacerbated by the fact 
that individuals with access to classified information are 
trained to neither confirm, deny, nor comment on any 
information that may be available to the public.144 
IV. NEED FOR MODIFICATIONS TO THE CURRENT LAW   
 
Given the current state of the law and the application of 
that law, there are many changes that are warranted to ensure 
the safety and security of our national secrets. This section 
proposes four changes to the law and how these changes can be 
applied to advance national security interests. These changes 
include: (1) revisions and clarification of the Espionage Act, (2) 
consistent prosecutions, (3) improved training, and (4) better 
explanations to the public at large. 
A. CHANGES NEEDED TO THE ESPIONAGE ACT  
 
First, it is evident from the case law that there has been 
much confusion about the application of §§ 793 and 794. As 
with any law, defendants and defense attorneys consistently try 
to find ways to avoid conviction under the law. A frequent 
                                                           
143 United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 515 (4th Cir.2013); 18 
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challenge that has been applied in defense arguments has been 
that the statute is unconstitutionally vague, particularly as it 
relates to the phrase “national defense.” While the courts have 
made an effort to broadly define national defense in this 
context, it is still very limiting with respect to classified 
information. If there is not a direct link between the acts of the 
defendant and national defense, then §§ 793-794 cannot be 
applied.145 It would be easy to visualize material that the 
government could consider classified but that is not directly 
related to national defense or related activities as defined by the 
courts (e.g., commercial nuclear reactors, Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act warrants).146 There is a heavy responsibility 
that should go along with having a security clearance. This 
responsibility should not depend on whether the classified 
information accessed is related to national defense or is simply 
considered classified for other reasons. For example, 
commercial nuclear reactors would certainly have the potential 
to involve classified information. However, if the reactor is only 
                                                           
145 18 U.S.C.A. § 793; 18 U.S.C.A. § 794. 
146 50 U.S.C.A § 1801 et seq. (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114-
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associated with generation of electricity for public 
consumption, it would likely be difficult to justify the national 
defense element of this statute. This type of information could 
certainly be a concern for the security of the American people if 
it were to fall into the hands of a rogue nation or terrorist 
organization. The restriction to tie the release of classified 
information to national defense is needlessly narrow. The term 
“national defense” should be stricken from the statue and in its 
place state that anything designated classified (e.g., Top Secret, 
Secret, or Confidential) is protected by the statute. Classified 
information has been classified for a reason, and this material 
must be protected for any number of reasons that may or may 
not be related to national defense. If there is a true need to 
protect national defense information that is not classified, then 
that should be addressed in a separate statute as it is best to 
clarify the statute and keep it simple and concise. 
Unfortunately, the existing statute has resulted in confusion by 
trying to provide detail in the “national defense” language. 
Along those same lines, parts of the statute require a 
“reason to believe” that the information would injure the 
United States and willful or grossly negligent behavior to be 
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applicable. However, the responsibility that goes with having 
access to classified information should be much more simply 
defined. The statute should simply criminalize the willful 
release of classified information regardless of what the 
individual believed would happen with the information. The 
fact that the information is classified should be sufficient to put 
the individual on notice that it could injure the United States if 
released. The mens rea should be the intent to release that 
information.  
Similarly, negligent treatment of classified material 
should continue to be treated as a crime. The mens rea would 
come from the knowledge that the information is classified so 
that reckless handling of the information results in the mens rea 
of not protecting classified information. The approach of the 
current statute that willful release incurs a more severe 
punishment than negligent release should be maintained. The 
recent issues surrounding Secretary Clinton and General 
Petraeus illustrate this point. There is no argument that 
Secretary Clinton intended to release classified information and 
harm the United States with her email server. However, the fact 
that other entities could have accessed that information does 
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not lessen the impact. If U.S. spies were identified through those 
emails and subsequently found by foreign governments, the 
argument that Secretary Clinton did not intend to harm the U.S. 
or those individuals does not change the fact that the harm 
occurred. As such, if Secretary Clinton knew the information 
was classified and did not protect it accordingly, then she 
would fall under the negligent release of classified information 
in this approach. Similarly, General Petraeus admitted to 
knowing the information he released was classified and 
intentionally released it anyway. He would fall under the 
intentional release of classified information in this approach. 
Similarly, the current statute draws a distinction 
between physical information (e.g., books) and intangible 
knowledge. This adds confusion and should be removed. 
Regardless of whether the classified information is tangible or 
intangible, there is a serious potential to harm the security 
interests of the United States.  
Finally, the sources and methods used for protection of 
classified information must also be protected. This type of 
protection should be clearer in the statute to emphasize the 
importance and lack of distinction between the methods and 
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the final information. One only need look at the damage done 
by Edward Snowden to understand that the methods of 
collecting classified information can be just as important as the 
information itself. The statute should specify that discussion of 
the methods and sources of classified information is also 
punishable under the statute. By making these changes in the 
statute, there will be a great deal of clarity and consolidation 
that will occur. 
B. MORE CONSISTENT PROSECUTIONS   
 
While the changes proposed will add clarity and allow 
easier prosecution for releasing unlawfully classified 
information, the key to the protection of the sensitive 
information is to punish violators of the statute. As noted in the 
referenced cases, the majority of §§ 793 and 794 prosecutions 
have been of government employees and contractors where the 
defendant made a conscious effort to steal information and 
provide that information to a foreign government or news 
outlet, knowing that the information is classified and protected 
by the government. However, when the defendant is a high 
profile or famous individual, suddenly the rules do not seem to 
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apply. The two prime examples are former Secretary of State 
Clinton and General Petraeus.  
In the case of Secretary Clinton, there was no desire to 
go through the headaches of prosecuting her for failing to 
protect classified information in violation of § 793(f). At present, 
there has been no consequence at all for Secretary Clinton with 
respect to failing to follow the appropriate requirements for 
classified information. This failure may have resulted in the 
release of classified information. Similarly, General Petraeus 
was prosecuted but avoided any type of significant penalty by 
pleading guilty to a lesser offense. The lack of any true 
consequence for release of classified information by Clinton and 
Petraeus shows the staff-level employees and public that there 
really is no downside to trying to make money based upon 
access to classified information and/or bypass security 
protocols. This type of publicity serves to demoralize the 
government work force and make individuals with a security 
clearance ask themselves why they need to be diligent in 
protecting classified information. If senior military and political 
officials routinely skirt or intentionally violate the rules and 
there is no punishment, what is the point? In addition to the 
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need for a revised and clarified law on release of classified 
information, there needs to be a renewed and focused effort to 
prosecute violators of that law. These prosecutions must start at 
the top and work their way down to the staff level. A serious 
effort to enforce the rules will put everyone on notice, including 
political officials, that the security of our nation is paramount 
and will not be compromised at any level by anyone. The result 
will be an effort to emphasize proper handling of classified 
material and a much safer and secure country. Letting 
individuals off with no real penalty simply encourages and 
emboldens the next person to do the same thing, whether for 
monetary or political gain. 
C. IMPROVED TRAINING TO ACCESS CLASSIFIED 
INFORMATION 
    
Not only must there be changes made to the Espionage 
Act, but improvements must be made to the training of those 
who hold security clearances. As noted previously, there are 
multiple examples where training for handling of classified 
information is not consistently implemented. The real problem 
with the training falls into two areas. First, there is no real 
consequence for failing to complete classified material training. 
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The former Secretary of State did not complete the training and 
was allowed to run for President of the United States. In theory, 
failing to complete the training can result in revocation of the 
individual’s security clearance, and thus restriction from access 
of classified material; however, in practice, this is not 
implemented. How many of the 80% of employees at the State 
Department who failed to complete the training lost their 
security clearance?147 The articles and reports of this number do 
not reference anyone losing their clearance. Congress needs to 
mandate that the agencies and departments have a hard date 
each year for completion of classified material training. If this 
date is exceeded, the individual should immediately lose their 
security clearance. There are obvious needs for extenuating 
circumstances to reinstate the clearance, but these should be the 
exception and not the norm. If everyone fully understands what 
will happen if you fail to complete the training, then there will 
be very few who test the limits of that requirement. The second 
issue is that most classified material training is only available 
online. Most online training is more of a nuisance than an 
opportunity to learn or refresh knowledge. Individuals will 
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frequently page through the online slides without reading any 
of them. In addition, exams that are provided online are also 
less than effective. Individuals are free to look up answers prior 
to answering. It is noted that references can frequently be used 
in real life, but a simple yes/no question that can be answered 
with a search function in the electronic file does not really test 
knowledge. There should be a requirement for periodic 
classroom training for access to classified information. This may 
not be feasible every year due to financial and resource 
restrictions, but periodic (e.g., every 2 or 3 years) classroom 
training is critical to ensure individuals maintain the level of 
knowledge necessary to protect the national secrets of the 
United States. 
D. BETTER PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING  
 WITH RESPECT TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION   
  
Finally, the public is not informed as to how the 
government tries to protect national secrets and national 
security. For example, when asked about whether unlawfully 
disclosed information is true, an individual in an official 
position or with appropriate security clearance can neither 
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confirm nor deny.148 This is completely appropriate to protect 
information. Denying something is classified in one instance 
will inadvertently admit something else is classified when 
denial is not provided. However, the public needs to be made 
aware that cleared individuals are not allowed to comment so 
that national secrets are protected. The government needs some 
type of media campaign to inform the public as to why these 
national secrets must be protected and that there cannot be any 
comment on the information. The biggest thing to explain to the 
public is that the information being protected cannot be 
disclosed due to national security. Some in the public believe 
classification is used to simply hide information from the public 
(i.e., the government is keeping something secret because it is 
doing something illegal or disliked). In reality, the information 
is protected to prevent damage to the safety and security of the 
United States. The government must undergo some type of 
media campaign to assure the public that the classification of 
material is for a good reason. Once the public is convinced, they 
                                                           
148 DOD, supra note 8. 
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 157  
 
will not only support but will require that violators of the law 
be punished. 
V. CONCLUSIONS   
 
Consolidating the convoluted espionage laws into one 
statute will certainly make it easier for prosecutors to determine 
the applicable law when prosecuting a case. As currently 
written, the statute provides many potential ambiguities that 
are frequently challenged in court. While consolidation and 
clarification will assist in the prosecution for release of classified 
information, the key is to enforce the law consistently across the 
board. It should not matter who the individual is, they should 
be subject to the same consequences. Until the law is 
consistently enforced and applied to everyone, from politicians 
and military generals to lower level federal employees and 
contractors, there will never be a consistent understanding of 
what constitutes a violation of law when classified information 
is made available to the public. All individuals with access to 
classified information should be able to read and easily 
understand the law, be properly trained on the application of 
the law, and be subject to severe consequences for violating the 
law. This type of application will need to be applied from the 
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top down, including Congressmen, politicians, and high-
ranking officials. Classified information is the key to the success 
and security of the United States. It must continue to be treated 
seriously with violations and unauthorized releases receiving 
consistent punishment at all levels. Individuals that have access 
to such information must be trained properly and effectively to 
ensure they know what they can or cannot do. A key to this 
implementation is convincing the public that the classified 
information protection is critical to the safety and security of 
our nation. These recommendations will serve to strengthen 
our security and enhance the safety of the citizens of the United 
States. 
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Appendix A 
18 U.S.C.A. § 793 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114-248). 
§ 793. Gathering, transmitting or losing defense information 
(a) Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information 
respecting the national defense with intent or reason to believe 
that the information is to be used to the injury of the United 
States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation, goes upon, 
enters, flies over, or otherwise obtains information concerning 
any vessel, aircraft, work of defense, navy yard, naval station, 
submarine base, fueling station, fort, battery, torpedo station, 
dockyard, canal, railroad, arsenal, camp, factory, mine, 
telegraph, telephone, wireless, or signal station, building, office, 
research laboratory or station or other place connected with the 
national defense owned or constructed, or in progress of 
construction by the United States or under the control of the 
United States, or of any of its officers, departments, or agencies, 
or within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, or any 
place in which any vessel, aircraft, arms, munitions, or other 
materials or instruments for use in time of war are being made, 
prepared, repaired, stored, or are the subject of research or 
development, under any contract or agreement with the United 
States, or any department or agency thereof, or with any person 
on behalf of the United States, or otherwise on behalf of the 
United States, or any prohibited place so designated by the 
President by proclamation in time of war or in case of national 
emergency in which anything for the use of the Army, Navy, or 
Air Force is being prepared or constructed or stored, 
information as to which prohibited place the President has 
determined would be prejudicial to the national defense; or 
(b) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, and with like intent or 
reason to believe, copies, takes, makes, or obtains, or attempts 
to copy, take, make, or obtain, any sketch, photograph, 
photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, 
instrument, appliance, document, writing, or note of anything 
connected with the national defense; or 
(c) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, receives or obtains or 
agrees or attempts to receive or obtain from any person, or from 
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any source whatever, any document, writing, code book, signal 
book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, 
plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note, of anything 
connected with the national defense, knowing or having reason 
to believe, at the time he receives or obtains, or agrees or 
attempts to receive or obtain it, that it has been or will be 
obtained, taken, made, or disposed of by any person contrary 
to the provisions of this chapter; or 
(d) Whoever, lawfully having possession of, access to, control 
over, or being entrusted with any document, writing, code 
book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, 
blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note 
relating to the national defense, or information relating to the 
national defense which information the possessor has reason to 
believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the 
advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, 
delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or 
transmitted or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or 
cause to be communicated, delivered or transmitted the same 
to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the 
same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee 
of the United States entitled to receive it; or 
(e) Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or 
control over any document, writing, code book, signal book, 
sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, 
map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the 
national defense, or information relating to the national defense 
which information the possessor has reason to believe could be 
used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of 
any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits 
or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or 
attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be 
communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any 
person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same 
and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United 
States entitled to receive it; or  
(f) Whoever, being entrusted with or having lawful possession 
or control of any document, writing, code book, signal book, 
sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, 
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map, model, instrument, appliance, note, or information, 
relating to the national defense, (1) through gross negligence 
permits the same to be removed from its proper place of 
custody or delivered to anyone in violation of his trust, or to be 
lost, stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, or (2) having knowledge 
that the same has been illegally removed from its proper place 
of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of its trust, or lost, 
or stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, and fails to make prompt 
report of such loss, theft, abstraction, or destruction to his 
superior officer— 
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten 
years, or both. 
(g) If two or more persons conspire to violate any of the 
foregoing provisions of this section, and one or more of such 
persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of 
the parties to such conspiracy shall be subject to the punishment 
provided for the offense which is the object of such conspiracy. 
(h)(1) Any person convicted of a violation of this section shall 
forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any provision of State 
law, any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds 
the person obtained, directly or indirectly, from any foreign 
government, or any faction or party or military or naval force 
within a foreign country, whether recognized or unrecognized 
by the United States, as the result of such violation. For the 
purposes of this subsection, the term “State” includes a State of 
the United States, the District of Columbia, and any 
commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States. 
(2) The court, in imposing sentence on a defendant for a 
conviction of a violation of this section, shall order that the 
defendant forfeit to the United States all property described in 
paragraph (1) of this subsection. 
(3) The provisions of subsections (b), (c), and (e) through (p) of 
section 413 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853(b), (c), and (e)-(p)) shall apply 
to-- 
(A) property subject to forfeiture under this subsection; 
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(B) any seizure or disposition of such property; and 
(C) any administrative or judicial proceeding in relation to such 
property, if not inconsistent with this subsection. 
(4) Notwithstanding section 524(c) of title 28, there shall be 
deposited in the Crime Victims Fund in the Treasury all 
amounts from the forfeiture of property under this subsection 
remaining after the payment of expenses for forfeiture and sale 
authorized by law. 
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Appendix A 
18 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114-248). 
§ 794. Gathering or delivering defense information to aid 
foreign government 
(a) Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used 
to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign 
nation, communicates, delivers, or transmits, or attempts to 
communicate, deliver, or transmit, to any foreign government, 
or to any faction or party or military or naval force within a 
foreign country, whether recognized or unrecognized by the 
United States, or to any representative, officer, agent, employee, 
subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly, any 
document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, 
photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note, 
instrument, appliance, or information relating to the national 
defense, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for any 
term of years or for life, except that the sentence of death shall 
not be imposed unless the jury or, if there is no jury, the court, 
further finds that the offense resulted in the identification by a 
foreign power (as defined in section 101(a) of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978) of an individual acting as 
an agent of the United States and consequently in the death of 
that individual, or directly concerned nuclear weaponry, 
military spacecraft or satellites, early warning systems, or other 
means of defense or retaliation against largescale attack; war 
plans; communications intelligence or cryptographic 
information; or any other major weapons system or major 
element of defense strategy. 
(b) Whoever, in time of war, with intent that the same shall be 
communicated to the enemy, collects, records, publishes, or 
communicates, or attempts to elicit any information with 
respect to the movement, numbers, description, condition, or 
disposition of any of the Armed Forces, ships, aircraft, or war 
materials of the United States, or with respect to the plans or 
conduct, or supposed plans or conduct of any naval or military 
operations, or with respect to any works or measures 
undertaken for or connected with, or intended for the 
fortification or defense of any place, or any other information 
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relating to the public defense, which might be useful to the 
enemy, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for any 
term of years or for life. 
(c) If two or more persons conspire to violate this section, and 
one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the 
conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be 
subject to the punishment provided for the offense which is the 
object of such conspiracy. 
(d)(1) Any person convicted of a violation of this section shall 
forfeit to the United States irrespective of any provision of State 
law. 
(A) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds 
the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such 
violation, and 
(B) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in 
any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission 
of, such violation. 
For the purposes of this subsection, the term “State” includes a 
State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any 
commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States. 
(2) The court, in imposing sentence on a defendant for a 
conviction of a violation of this section, shall order that the 
defendant forfeit to the United States all property described in 
paragraph (1) of this subsection. 
(3) The provisions of subsections (b), (c) and (e) through (p) of 
section 413 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853(b), (c), and (e)-(p)) shall apply 
to-- 
(A) property subject to forfeiture under this subsection; 
(B) any seizure or disposition of such property; and 
(C) any administrative or judicial proceeding in relation to such 
property, if not inconsistent with this subsection. 
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(4) Notwithstanding section 524(c) of title 28, there shall be 
deposited in the Crime Victims Fund in the Treasury all 
amounts from the forfeiture of property under this subsection 
remaining after the payment of expenses for forfeiture and sale 
authorized by law. 
